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Abstract This chapter describes a unified framework for the detection and cor-
rection of silent errors, which constitute a major threat for scientific applications
at extreme-scale. We first motivate the problem and explain why checkpointing
must be combined with some verification mechanism. Then we introduce a general-
purpose technique based upon computational patterns that periodically repeat over
time. These patterns interleave verifications and checkpoints, and we show how
to determine the pattern minimizing expected execution time. Then we move to
application-specific techniques and review dynamic programming algorithms for
linear chains of tasks, as well as ABFT-oriented algorithms for iterative methods in
sparse linear algebra.
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1 Introduction
For High-Performance Computing (HPC) applications, scale is a major opportunity.
Massive parallelism with 100,000+ nodes is the most viable path to achieving sus-
tained petascale performance. Future platforms will exploit even more computing
resources to enter the exascale era.
Unfortunately, scale is also a major threat, because resilience becomes a key
challenge. Even if each node provides an individual MTBF (Mean Time Between
Failures) of, say, one century, a machine with 100,000 such nodes encounters on
average a failure every 9 hours, an interval much shorter than the execution time of
many HPC applications. Note that (i) a one-century MTBF per node is an optimistic
figure, given that each node features several hundreds of cores; and (ii) in some
scenarios for the path to exascale computing [15], one envisions platforms including
up to one million such nodes, whose MTBF will decrease to 52 minutes.
Several kinds of errors need to be considered when computing at scale. In the
recent years, the HPC community has traditionally focused on fail-stop errors, such
as hardware failures. The de facto general-purpose technique to recover from fail-
stop errors is checkpoint/restart [11, 17]. This technique employs checkpoints to
periodically save the state of a parallel application, so that when an error strikes
some process, the application can be restored into one of its former states. There
are several families of checkpointing protocols, but they share a common feature:
each checkpoint forms a consistent recovery line, i.e., when an error is detected,
one can rollback to the last checkpoint and resume execution, after a downtime
and a recovery time. Many models are available to understand the behavior of the
checkpointing and restarting techniques [8, 14, 31, 37].
While the picture is quite clear for fail-stop errors, the community has yet to de-
vise an efficient approach to cope with silent errors, primary source of silent data
corruptions. Such errors must also be accounted for when executing HPC applica-
tions [28, 30, 39, 40, 41]. They may be caused, for instance, by soft errors in L1
cache, arithmetic errors in the ALU (Arithmetic and Logic Unit), or bit flips due to
cosmic radiation. The main issue is that the impact of silent errors is not immediate,
since they do not manifest themselves until the corrupted data impact the result of
the computation (see Figure 1), leading to a failure. If an error striking before the last
checkpoint is detected after that checkpoint, then the checkpoint is corrupted, and
cannot be used to restore the application. If only fail-stop failures are considered,
a checkpoint cannot contain a corrupted state, because a process subject to failure
cannot create a checkpoint or participate to the application: failures are naturally
contained to failed processes. When dealing with silent errors, however, faults can
propagate to other processes and checkpoints, because processes continue to partic-
ipate and follow the protocol during the interval that separates the occurrence of the
error from its detection.
In Figure 1, Xs and Xd are random variables that represent the time until the next
silent error and its detection latency, respectively. We usually assume that silent
errors strike according to a Poisson process of parameter λ , so that Xs has the dis-
tribution of an exponential law of parameter λ and mean 1/λ . On the contrary, it
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Fig. 1 Error and detection latency.
is very hard to make assumptions on the distribution of Xd . To alleviate the prob-
lem of detection latency, one may envision to keep several checkpoints in memory,
and to restore the application from the last valid checkpoint, thereby rolling back to
the last correct state of the application [25]. This multiple-checkpoint approach has
three major drawbacks. First, it is demanding in terms of storage: each checkpoint
typically represents a copy of the entire memory footprint of the application, which
may well correspond to several terabytes. The second drawback is the possibility of
fatal failures. Indeed, if we keep k checkpoints in memory, the approach requires
that the last checkpoint still kept in memory to precede the instant when the error
currently detected struck. Otherwise, all live checkpoints would be corrupted, and
one would have to re-execute the entire application from scratch. The probability of
a fatal failure for various error distribution laws and values of k can be evaluated [1].
The third and most serious drawback of this approach applies even without mem-
ory constraints, i.e., if we could store an infinite number of checkpoints in memory.
The critical point is to determine which checkpoint is the last valid one, information
which is necessary to recover from a valid application state. However, because of
the detection latency (which is unknown), we do not know when the silent error has
indeed occurred, hence we cannot identify the last valid checkpoint, unless some
verification mechanism is enforced.
We introduce such verification mechanisms in this chapter. In Section 2, we dis-
cuss several approaches to validation (recomputation, checksums, coherence tests,
orthogonalization checks, etc). Then in Section 3 we adopt a general-purpose ap-
proach, which is agnostic of the nature of the verification mechanism. We consider
a divisible-load application (which means that we can take checkpoints at any in-
stant), and we partition the execution into computational patterns that repeat over
time. The simplest pattern is represented by a work chunk followed by a verified
checkpoint, which corresponds to performing a verification just before taking each
checkpoint. If the verification succeeds, then one can safely store the checkpoint. If
the verification fails, then a silent error has struck since the last checkpoint, and one
can safely recover from it to resume the execution of the application. We compute
the optimal length of the work chunk in the simplest pattern in Section 3.1, which
amounts to revisiting Young and Daly’s formula [37, 14] for silent errors. While
taking a checkpoint without verification seems a bad idea (because of the memory
cost, and of the risk of saving corrupted data), a validation step not immediately
followed by a checkpoint may be interesting. Indeed, if silent errors are frequent
enough, verifying the data in between two (verified) checkpoints, will reduce in ex-
pectation the detection latency and thus the amount of work to be re-executed due
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to possible silent errors. The major goal of Section 3 is to determine the best pattern
composed of m work chunks, where each chunk is followed by a verification and the
last chunk is followed by a verified checkpoint. We show how to determine m and
the length of each chunk so as to minimize the makespan, that is the total execution
time.
Then we move to application workflows. In Section 4, we consider application
workflows that consist of a number of parallel tasks that execute on a platform, and
that exchange data at the end of their execution. In other words, the task graph is
a linear chain, and each task (except maybe the first and the last one) reads data
from its predecessor and produces data for its successor. This scenario corresponds
to a high-performance computing application whose workflow is partitioned into a
succession of (typically large) tightly-coupled computational kernels, each of them
being identified as a task by the model. At the end of each task, we can either
perform a verification on the task output, or perform a verification followed by a
checkpoint. We provide dynamic programming algorithms to determine the optimal
locations of checkpoints and verifications.
The last technique that we illustrate is application-specific. In Section 5, we deal
with sparse linear algebra kernels, and we show how to combine ABFT (Algorithm
Based Fault Tolerance) with checkpointing. In a nutshell, ABFT consists in adding
checksums to application data, and to view them as extended data items. The ap-
plication performs the same computational updates on the original data and on the
checksums, thereby avoiding the need to recompute the checksums after each up-
date. The salient feature of this approach is forward recovery: ABFT is used both
as an error verification and error correction mechanism: whenever a single error
strikes, it can be corrected via ABFT and there is no need to rollback for recovery.
Finally, we outline main conclusions and directions for future work in Section 6.
2 Verification mechanisms
Considerable efforts have been directed at error-checking to reveal silent errors.
Error detection is usually very costly. Hardware mechanisms, such as ECC (Error
Correcting Code) memory, can detect and even correct a fraction of errors, but in
practice they are complemented with software techniques. General-purpose tech-
niques are based on replication [18, 21, 34, 38]. Indeed, performing the operation
twice and comparing the results of the replicas makes it possible to detect a sin-
gle silent error. With Triple Modular Redundancy [26] (TMR) , errors can also be
corrected by means of a voting scheme. Another approach, proposed by Moody et
al. [29], is based on checkpointing and replication and enables detection and fast
recovery of applications from both silent errors and hard errors.
Coming back to verification mechanisms, application-specific information can
be helpful in designing ad hoc solutions, which can dramatically decrease the cost
of detection. Many techniques have been advocated. They include memory scrub-
bing [24], but also ABFT techniques [7, 23, 35], such as coding for the SpMxV
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(Sparse Matrix-Vector multiplication) kernel [35], and coupling a higher-order with
a lower-order scheme for Ordinary Differential Equations [6]. These methods can
only detect an error but not correct it. Self-stabilizing corrections after error de-
tection in the conjugate gradient method are investigated by Sao and Vuduc [33].
Also, Heroux and Hoemmen [22] design a fault-tolerant GMRES algorithm capable
of converging despite silent errors, and Bronevetsky and de Supinski [9] provide a
comparative study of detection cost for iterative methods. Elliot et al. [16] combine
partial redundancy and checkpointing, and confirm the benefit of dual and triple re-
dundancy. The drawback is that twice the number of processing resources is required
(for dual redundancy).
A nice instantiation of the checkpoint and verification mechanism that we study
in this chapter is provided by Chen [12], who deals with sparse iterative solvers.
Consider a simple method such as the Preconditioned Conjugate Gradient (PCG)
method: Chen’s approach performs a periodic verification every d iterations, and
a periodic checkpoint every d× c iterations, which is a particular case, with equi-
spaced validations, of the approach presented later in Section 3.2. For PCG, the
verification amounts to checking the orthogonality of two vectors and to recomput-
ing and checking the residual. The cost of the verification is small if compared to
the cost of an iteration, especially when the preconditioner requires many more flops
than a SpMxV. As already mentioned, the approach presented in Section 3 is agnos-
tic of the underlying error-detection technique and takes the cost of verification as
an input parameter to the model.
3 Patterns for divisible load applications
In this section we explain how to derive the optimal pattern of interleaving check-
points and verifications. An extended presentation of the results is available in [2, 4,
10].
3.1 Revisiting Young and Daly’s formula
Consider a divisible-load application, i.e., a (parallel) job that can be interrupted at
any time for checkpointing, for a nominal cost C. To deal with fail-stop failures, the
execution is partitioned into same-size chunks followed by a checkpoint, and there
exist well-known formulae by Young [37] and Daly [14] to determine the optimal
checkpointing period.
To deal with silent errors, the simplest protocol (see Figure 2) would be to per-
form a verification (at a cost V ) just before taking each checkpoint. If the verification
succeeds, then one can safely store the checkpoint and mark it as valid. If the ver-
ification fails, then an error has struck since the last checkpoint, which is correct
having been verified, and one can safely recover (which takes a time R) from that
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checkpoint to resume the execution of the application. This protocol with verifica-
tions zeroes out the risk of fatal errors that would force to restart the execution from
scratch.
Time
V C W V C W V C (Without error)
Time
V C W V R W V C W V C
Error
Detection
(With error)
Fig. 2 The simplest pattern: a work chunk W followed by a verification V and a checkpoint C.
To compute the optimal length of the work chunk W ∗, we first have to define the
objective function. The aim is to find a pattern P (with a work chunk of length W
followed by a verification of length V and a checkpoint of length C) that minimizes
the expected execution time of the application. Let Wbase denote the base execution
time of an application without any overhead due to resilience techniques (without
loss of generality, we assume unit-speed execution). The execution is divided into
periodic patterns, as shown in Figure 2. Let E(P) be the expected execution time
of the pattern. For large jobs, the expected makespan Wfinal of the application when
taking failures into account can then be approximated by
Wfinal ≈ E(P)W ×Wbase =Wbase+H(P) ·Wbase
where
H(P) =
E(P)
W
−1
is the expected overhead of the pattern. Thus, minimizing the expected makespan is
equivalent to minimizing the pattern overhead H(P). Hence, we focus on minimiz-
ing the pattern overhead. We assume that silent errors are independent and follow a
Poisson process with arrival rate λ . The probability of having at least a silent error
during a computation of length w is given by p = 1− e−λw. We assume that errors
cannot strike during recovery and verification. The following proposition shows the
expected execution time of a pattern with a fixed work length W .
Proposition 1. The expected execution time of a pattern P with work length W is
E(P) =W +V +C+λW 2+λW (V +R)+O(λ 2W 3) . (1)
Proof. Let p= 1−e−λW denote the probability of having at least one silent error in
the pattern. The expected execution time obeys the recursive formula
E(P) =W +V + p(R+E(P))+(1− p)C . (2)
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Equation (2) can be interpreted as follows: we always execute the work chunk and
run the verification to detect silent errors, whose occurrence requires not only a
recovery but also a re-execution of the whole pattern. Otherwise, if no silent error
strikes, we can proceed with the checkpoint. Solving the recursion in Equation (2),
we obtain
E(P) = eλW (W +V )+
(
eλW −1
)
R+C .
By approximating eλx = 1+λx+ λ
2x2
2 up to the second-order term, we can further
simplify the expected execution time and obtain Equation (1). uunionsq
The following theorem gives a first-order approximation to the optimal work
length of a pattern.
Theorem 1. A first-order approximation to the optimal work length W ∗ is given by
W ∗ =
√
V +C
λ
. (3)
The optimal expected overhead is
H∗(P) = 2
√
λ (V +C)+O(λ ) . (4)
Proof. From the result of Proposition 1, the expected overhead of the pattern can be
computed as
H(P) =
V +C
W
+λW +λ (V +R)+O(λ 2W 2) . (5)
Assume that the MTBF of the platform µ = 1/λ is large if compared to the re-
silience parameters. Then consider the first two terms of H(P) in Equation (5): the
overhead is minimal when the pattern has length W =Θ(λ−1/2), and in that case
both terms are in the order of λ 1/2, so that we have
H(P) =Θ(λ 1/2)+O(λ ).
Indeed, the last term O(λ ) becomes also negligible when compared to Θ(λ 1/2).
Hence, the optimal pattern length W ∗ can be obtained by balancing the first two
terms in Equation (5), which gives Equation (3). Then, by substituting W ∗ back into
H(P), we get the optimal expected overhead in Equation (4). uunionsq
We observe from Theorem 1 that the optimal work length W ∗ of a pattern is in
Θ
(
λ−1/2
)
, and the optimal overhead H∗(P) is inΘ(λ 1/2). This allows us to express
the expected execution overhead of a pattern as H(P) = oefW +orwW +O(λ ), where
oef and orw are two key parameters that characterize two different types of overheads
in the execution, and they are defined below.
Definition 1. For a given pattern, oef denotes the error-free overhead due to the
resilience operations (e.g., verification, checkpointing), and orw denotes the re-
executed work overhead, in terms of the fraction of re-executed work due to errors.
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In the simple pattern we analyze above, these two overheads are given by
oef =V +C and orw = λ , respectively. The optimal pattern length and the optimal
expected overhead can thus be expressed as
W ∗ =
√
oef
orw
,
H∗(P) = 2
√
oef ·orw+O(λ ) .
We see that minimizing the expected execution overhead H(P) of a pattern be-
comes equivalent to minimizing the product oef× orw up to the dominating term.
Intuitively, including more resilient operations reduces the re-executed work over-
head but adversely increases the error-free overhead, and vice versa. This requires
a resilience protocol that finds the optimal tradeoff between oef and orw. We make
use of this observation in the next section to derive the optimal pattern in a more
complicated protocol where patterns are allowed to include several chunks.
3.2 Optimal pattern
If the verification cost is small when compared to the checkpoint cost, there is room
for optimization. Consider the pattern illustrated in Figure 3 with three verifications
per checkpoint. There are three chunks of size w1, w2, and w3, each followed by a
verification. Every third verification is followed by a checkpoint.
Time
V C w1 V w2 V w3 V C (Without error)
Time
V C w1 V w2 V R w1 V w2 V w3 V C
Error
Detection
(With error)
Fig. 3 Pattern with three verifications per checkpoint.
To understand the advantages of such a pattern, assume w1 = w2 = w3 =W/3
for now, so that the total amount of work is the same as in the simplest pattern.
As before, a single checkpoint needs to be kept in memory, and each error leads to
re-executing the work since the last checkpoint. But detection occurs much more
rapidly in the new pattern, because of the intermediate verifications. If the error
strikes during the first of the three chunks, it is detected by the first verification, and
only the first chunk is re-executed. Similarly, if the error strikes the execution of the
second chunk (as illustrated in the figure), it is detected by the second verification,
and the first two chunks are re-executed. The entire frame of work needs to be
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re-executed only if the error strikes during the third chunk. Under the first-order
approximation as in the analysis of Theorem 1, the average amount of work to re-
execute is (1+ 2+ 3)w/3 = 2w = 2W/3, that is, the re-executed work overhead
becomes orw = 2λ/3. On the contrary, in the first pattern of Figure 2, the amount of
work to re-execute is always W , because the error is never detected before the end of
the pattern. Hence, the second pattern leads to a 33% gain in the re-execution time.
However, this comes at the price of three times as many verifications, that is, the
error-free overhead becomes oef = 3V +C. This overhead is paid in every error-free
execution, and may be an overkill if the verification mechanism is too costly.
This example shows that finding the best trade-off between error-free overhead
(what is paid due to the resilience method, when there is no failure during execu-
tion) and execution time (when errors strike) is not a trivial task. The optimization
problem can be stated as follows: given the cost of checkpointing C, recovery R,
and verification V , what is the optimal pattern to minimize the (expectation of the)
execution time? A pattern is composed of several work chunks, each followed by
a verification, and the last chunk is always followed by both a verification and a
checkpoint. Let m denote the number of chunks in the pattern, and let w j denote the
length of the j-th chunk for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Let W = ∑mj=1 w j. We define β j = w j/W
be the relative length of the j-th chunk so that β j ≥ 0 and ∑mj=1β j = 1. We let
β = [β1,β2, . . . ,βm]. The goal is to determine the pattern work length W , the num-
ber of chunks m as well as the relative length vector β .
Proposition 2. The expected execution time of the above pattern is
E(P) =W +mV +C+
(
λβ T Aβ
)
W 2+O(
√
λ ) , (6)
where A is an m×m matrix whose diagonal coefficients are equal to 1 and whose
other coefficients are all equal to 12 .
Proof. Let p j = 1− e−λw j denote the probability of having at least one silent error
in chunk j. To derive the expected execution time of the pattern, we need to know
the probability q j that the chunk j actually gets executed in the current attempt.
The first chunk is always executed, so we have q1 = 1. Consider the second
chunk, which is executed if no silent error strikes the first chunk, hence q2 = 1− p1.
In general, the probability that the j-th chunk gets executed is
q j =
j−1
∏
k=1
(1− pk) .
Now, we are ready to compute the expected execution time of the pattern. The fol-
lowing gives the recursive expression:
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E(P) =
(
m
∏
k=1
(1− pk)
)
C
+
(
1−
m
∏
k=1
(1− pk)
)
(R+E(P))
+
m
∑
j=1
q j(w j +V ) . (7)
Specifically, line 1 of Equation (7) shows that the checkpoint at the end of the pat-
tern is performed only when there has been no silent error in any of the chunks.
Otherwise, we need to re-execute the pattern, after a recovery, as shown in line 2.
Finally, line 3 shows the condition for each chunk j to be executed. By simplifying
Equation (7) and approximating the expression up to the second-order term, as in
the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain
E(P) =W +mV +C+λ fW 2+O(
√
λ ) ,
where f =∑mj=1β j
(
∑mk= j βk
)
, and it can be concisely written as f =β T Mβ , where
M is the m×m matrix given by
mi, j =
{
1 for i≤ j
0 for i > j
.
By replacing M by its symmetric part A= M+M
T
2 , which does not affect the value of
f , we obtain the matrix A whose diagonal coefficients are equal to 1 and whose other
coefficients are all equal to 12 , and the expected execution time in Equation (6). uunionsq
Theorem 2. The optimal pattern has m∗ equal-length chunks, total length W ∗ and
is such that:
W ∗ =
√
m∗V +C
1
2
(
1+ 1m∗
)
λ
, (8)
β ∗j =
1
m∗
for 1≤ j ≤ m∗ , (9)
where m∗ is either max(1,bm¯∗c) or dm¯∗e with
m¯∗ =
√
C
V
. (10)
The optimal expected overhead is
H∗(P) =
√
2λC+
√
2λV +O(λ ) . (11)
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Proof. Given the number of chunks m with ∑mj=1β j = 1, the function f = β
T Aβ
is shown to be minimized [10, Theorem 1 with r = 1] when β follows Equation
(9), and its minimum value is given by f ∗ = 12
(
1+ 1m
)
. We derive the two types of
overheads as follows:
oef = mV +C ,
orw =
1
2
(
1+
1
m
)
λ .
The optimal work length W ∗ =
√
oef
orw
for any fixed m is thus given by Equa-
tion (8). The optimal number of chunks m¯∗ shown in Equation (10) is obtained by
minimizing F(m) = oef×orw. The number of chunks in a pattern can only be a pos-
itive integer, so m∗ is either max(1,bm¯∗c) or dm¯∗e, since F(m) is a convex function
of m. Finally, substituting Equation (10) back into H∗(P) = 2
√
oef×orw +O(λ )
gives rise to the optimal expected overhead as shown in Equation (11). uunionsq
4 Linear workflows
For an application composed of a chain of tasks, the problem of finding the optimal
checkpoint strategy, i.e., of determining which tasks to checkpoint, in order to mini-
mize the expected execution time when subject to fail-stop failures, has been solved
by Toueg and Babaoglu [36], using a dynamic programming algorithm. We revisit
the problem for silent errors by exploiting verification in addition to checkpoints.
An extended presentation of the results is available in [3, 5].
4.1 Setup
To deal with silent errors, resilience is provided through the use of checkpointing
coupled with an error detection (or verification) mechanism. When a silent error
is detected, we roll back to the nearest checkpoint and recover from there. As in
Section 3.1, let C denote the cost of checkpointing, R the cost of recovery, and V the
cost of a verification.
We consider a chain of tasks T1,T2, . . . ,Tn, where each task Ti has a weight wi
corresponding to the computational load. For notational convenience, we also define
Wi, j = ∑ jk=i+1 wk to be the time to execute tasks Ti+1 to Tj for any i≤ j. Once again
we assume that silent errors occur following a Poisson process with arrival rate λ
and that the probability of having at least one error during the execution of Wi, j is
given by pi, j = 1− e−λWi, j .
We enforce that a verification is always taken immediately before each check-
point, so that all checkpoints are valid, and hence only one checkpoint needs to be
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maintained at any time during the execution of the application. Furthermore, we as-
sume that errors only strike the computations, while verifications, checkpoints, and
recoveries are failure-free.
The goal is to find which task to verify and which task to checkpoint in order
to minimize the expected execution time of the task chain. To solve this problem,
we derive a two-level dynamic programming algorithm. For convenience, we add a
virtual task T0, which is always checkpointed, and whose recovery cost is zero. This
accounts for the fact that it is always possible to restart the application from scratch
at no extra cost. In the following, we describe the general scheme when considering
both verifications and checkpoints.
4.2 Dynamic programming
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the idea of the algorithm, which contains two dynamic
programming levels, responsible for placing checkpoints and verifications, respec-
tively, as well as an additional step to compute the expected execution time between
two verifications. The following describes each step of the algorithm in detail.
T0 V C T1 . . . Tc1 V C Tc1+1 . . . Tc2 V C . . .
Eckpt(c1) Everi f (c1,c2)
Eckpt(c2)
Fig. 4 First level of dynamic programming (Eckpt ).
Placing checkpoints. The first level focuses on the placement of verified check-
points, i.e., checkpoints preceded immediately by a verification. Let Eckpt(c2) de-
note the expected time to successfully execute all the tasks from T1 to Tc2 , where
Tc2 is verified and checkpointed. Now, to find the last verified checkpoint before
Tc2 , we try all possible locations from T0 to Tc2−1. For each location, say c1, we
call the function recursively with Eckpt(c1) (for placing checkpoints before Tc1 ), and
compute the expected time to execute the tasks from Tc1+1 to Tc2 . The latter is done
through Everi f (c1,c2), which also decides where to place additional verifications be-
tween Tc1+1 and Tc2 . Finally, we add the checkpointing cost C (after Tc2 ) to Eckpt(c2).
Overall, we can express Eckpt(c2) as follows:
Eckpt(c2) = min
0≤c1<c2
{Eckpt(c1)+Everi f (c1,c2)+C} .
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Note that a location c1 = 0 means that no further checkpoints are added. In this
case, we simply set Eckpt(0) = 0, which initializes the dynamic program. The total
expected time to execute all the tasks from T1 to Tn is thus given by Eckpt(n).
. . . Tc1 V C Tc1+1 . . . Tv1 V Tv1+1 . . . Tv2 V . . .
Everi f (c1,v1) E(c1,v1,v2)
Everi f (c1,v2)
Fig. 5 Second level of dynamic programming (Everi f ) and computation of expected execution time
between two verifications (E).
Placing additional verifications. The second level decides where to insert addi-
tional verifications between two tasks with verified checkpoints. The function is
initially called from the first level between two checkpointed tasks Tc1 and Tc2 , each
of which also comes with a verification. Therefore, we define Everi f (c1,v2) as the ex-
pected time to successfully execute all the tasks from Tc1+1 to Tv2 , knowing that the
last checkpoint is right after task Tc1 , and there is no additional checkpoint between
Tc1+1 and Tv2 . Note that Everi f (c1,v2) accounts only for the time required to execute
and verify these tasks. As before, we try all possible locations for the last verifica-
tion between Tc1 and Tv2 and, for each location v1, we call the function recursively
with Everi f (c1,v1). Furthermore, we add the expected time needed to successfully
execute the tasks Tv1+1 to Tv2 , denoted by E(c1,v1,v2), given the position c1 of the
last checkpoint. Overall, we can express Everi f (c1,v2) as follows:
Everi f (c1,v2) = min
c1≤v1<v2
{Everi f (c1,v1)+E(c1,v1,v2)} . (12)
Again, the case v1 = c1 means that no further verification is added, so we initialize
the dynamic program with Everi f (c1,c1) = 0. Note that the verification cost V at the
end of task Tv2 will be accounted for in the function E(c1,v1,v2).
Computing expected execution time between two verifications. Finally, to com-
pute the expected time to successfully execute several tasks between two verifica-
tions, we need the position of the last checkpoint c1, as well as the positions of the
two verifications v1 and v2.
First, we pay Wv1,v2 by executing all the tasks from Tv1+1 to Tv2 , followed by
the cost of verification V after Tv2 . During the execution, there is a probability
pv1,v2 = 1−e−λWv1 ,v2 of having a silent error, which will be detected by the verifica-
tion after Tv2 . In this case, we need to perform a recovery from the last checkpoint
after Tc1 with a cost R (set to 0 if c1 = 0), and re-execute the tasks from there by call-
ing the function Everi f (c1,v1) followed by E(c1,v1,v2). Therefore, we can express
E(c1,v1,v2) as follows:
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E(c1,v1,v2) =Wv1,v2 +V + pv1,v2
(
R+Everi f (c1,v1)+E(c1,v1,v2)
)
. (13)
Simplifying Equation (13), we get
E(c1,v1,v2) = eλWv1 ,v2 (Wv1,v2 +V )+
(
eλWv1 ,v2 −1
)(
R+Everi f (c1,v1)
)
.
Complexity. The complexity is dominated by the computation of the expected com-
pletion time table Everi f (c1,v2), which contains O(n2) entries, and each entry de-
pends on at most n other entries that are already computed. All tables are computed
in a bottom-up fashion, from the left to the right of the task chain. Hence, the overall
complexity of the algorithm is O(n3).
5 ABFT and checkpointing for linear algebra kernels
In this section we introduce ABFT (Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance) as an appli-
cation-specific technique which allows for both error detection and correction. We
streamline our discussion on the CG method, however, the techniques that we de-
scribe are applicable to any iterative solver that uses sparse matrix vector multiplies
and vector operations. This list includes many of the non-stationary iterative solvers
such as CGNE (Conjugate Gradient on Normal Equations), BiCG (Bi-Conjugate
Gradient), BiCGstab (Bi-Conjugate Gradient Stabilized), where sparse matrix trans-
pose vector multiply operations also take place. Preconditioned variants of these
solvers with an approximate inverse preconditioner (applied as an SpMxV, or two
SpMxVs) can also be made fault-tolerant with the proposed scheme. The extension
to PCG is described in [19].
In Section 5.1, we first provide a background on the CG method and give an
overview of both Chen’s stability tests [12] and ABFT protection schemes. Then we
detail ABFT techniques for the SpMxV kernel.
5.1 CG and fault tolerance mechanisms
The code for the CG method is shown in Algorithm 1. The main loop features a
sparse matrix-vector multiply, two inner products (for pᵀi q and ‖ri+1‖2), and three
vector operations of the form axpy.
Chen’s stability tests [12] amount to checking the orthogonality of vectors pi+1
and q, at the price of computing (pᵀi+1q)/(‖pi+1‖‖qi‖), and to checking the residual
at the price of an additional SpMxV operation Axi−b. The dominant cost of these
verifications is the additional SpMxV operation.
We investigate three fault tolerance mechanisms. The first one is ONLINE-
DETECTION; this is Chen’s original approach modified to save the matrix A in
addition to the current iteration vectors. This is needed when a silent error is de-
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Algorithm 1 The Conjugate Gradient algorithm for a positive definite matrix A.
Input: A ∈Rn×n,b,x0 ∈Rn,ε ∈R
Output: x ∈Rn : ‖Ax−b‖ ≤ ε
1: r0← b−Ax0;
2: p0← r0;
3: i← 0;
4: while ‖ri‖> ε (‖A‖ · ‖r0‖+‖b‖) do
5: q← Api;
6: αi←‖ri‖2 /pᵀi q;
7: xi+1← xi +α pi;
8: ri+1← ri−α q;
9: β ←‖ri+1‖2 /‖ri‖2;
10: pi+1← ri+1 +β pi;
11: i← i+1;
12: end while
13: return xi;
tected: if this error comes for a corruption in data memory, we need to recover with
a valid copy of the data matrix A. The second one is ABFT-DETECTION, which de-
tects errors and restarts from the most recent checkpoint. The thirds one is ABFT-
CORRECTION, which detects errors and corrects if there was only one, otherwise
restarts from the last checkpoint. The three methods under the study keep a valid
copy of A and have exactly the same checkpoint cost.
We now introduce the ingredients of our own protection and verification mecha-
nisms ABFT-DETECTION and ABFT-CORRECTION. We use ABFT techniques to
protect the SpMxV, its result (hence the vector q), the matrix A and the input vector
pi. As ABFT methods for vector operations is as costly as a repeated computation,
we use TMR for them for simplicity. That is we do not protect pi, q, ri, and xi of the
ith loop beyond the SpMxV at line 5 with ABFT, but we compute the dots, norms
and axpy operations in resilient mode.
Although theoretically possible, constructing ABFT mechanism to detect up to
k errors is practically not feasible for k > 2. The same mechanism can be used
to correct up to bk/2c errors. Therefore, we focus on detecting up to two errors
and correcting single errors. That is, we detect up to two errors in the computation
q← Api (two entries in q are faulty), or in pi, or in the sparse representation of the
matrix A. With TMR, we assume that the errors in the computation are not overly
frequent so that two results out of three are correct (we assume errors do not strike
the vector data here). Our fault-tolerant CG versions thus have the following ingre-
dients: ABFT to detect up to two errors in the SpMxV and correct up to one; TMR
for vector operations; and checkpoint and roll-back in case errors are not corrected.
In the rest of this section, we discuss the proposed ABFT method for the SpMxV
(combining ABFT with checkpointing is later in Section 5.3).
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5.2 ABFT-SpMxV
The overhead of the standard single error correcting ABFT technique is too high
for the sparse matrix-vector product case. Shantaram et al. [35] propose a cheaper
ABFT SpMxV algorithm that guarantees detection of single errors striking either the
computation or the memory representation of the two input operands (matrix and
vector). As their results depend on the sparse storage format adopted, throughout
this section we assume that sparse matrices are stored in the compressed storage
format by rows (CSR) format [32, Sec. 3.4], that is by means of three distinct arrays,
namely Colid ∈Nnnz(A), Val ∈Rnnz(A) and Rowidx ∈Nn+1.
Shantaram et al. can protect y←Ax, where A ∈Rn×n and x,y ∈Rn. To perform
error detection, they rely on a column checksum vector c defined by
c j =
n
∑
i=1
ai, j (14)
and an auxiliary copy x′ of the x vector. After having performed the actual SpMxV,
to validate the result it suffices to compute ∑ni=1 yi, cᵀx and cᵀx′, and to compare
their values. It can be shown [35] that in the case of no errors, these three quanti-
ties carry the same value, whereas if a single error strikes either the memory or the
computation, one of them must differ from the other two. Nevertheless, this method
requires A to be strictly diagonally dominant, that seems to restrict too much the
practical applicability of their ABFT scheme. Shantaram et al. need this condition
to ensure the detection of errors striking an entry of x corresponding to a zero check-
sum column of A. We further analyze that case and show how to overcome the issue
without imposing any restriction on A.
A nice way to characterize the problem is expressing it in geometrical terms. Let
us consider the computation of a single entry of the checksum as
(wᵀA) j =
n
∑
i=1
wiai, j = wᵀA j,
where w ∈ Rn denotes the weight vector and A j the j-th column of A. Let us now
interpret such an operation as the result of the scalar product 〈·, ·〉 : Rn×Rn → R
defined by 〈u,v〉 7→ uᵀv. It is clear that a checksum entry is zero if and only if the
corresponding column of the matrix is orthogonal to the weight vector. In (14), we
have chosen w to be such that wi = 1 for 1≤ i≤ n, in order to make the computation
easier. Let us see now what happens without this restriction.
The problem reduces to finding a vector w ∈ Rn that is not orthogonal to any
vector out of a basis B = {b1, . . . ,bn} of Rn – the rows of the input matrix. Each
one of these n vectors is perpendicular to a hyperplane hi of Rn, and w does not
verify the condition
〈w,bi〉 6= 0, (15)
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Algorithm 2 ABFT-protected SpMxV, detection of 2 errors, correction of 1 error
Input: A ∈Rn×n(asVal ∈Rnnz(A),Colid ∈Nnnz(A),Rowidx ∈Rn), x ∈Rn
Output: y = Ax, correction of single error or detection of double error
1: global Wᵀ← [11 12 ...... 1n] ∈R2×n;
2: global Wᵀ← [Wᵀ 1n+1] ∈R2×n+1;
3: x′← x;
4: [C,M,cr,cx] = COMPUTECHECKSUMS(Val, Colid, Rowidx);
5: return SPMXV(Val, Colid, Rowidx, x, x′, M, cr , cx);
6: function COMPUTECHECKSUMS(Val, Colid, Rowidx)
7: Cᵀ←WᵀA;
8: M←W−C;
9: cr ←WᵀRowidx;
10: cx←Wᵀx;
11: return C,M,cr,cx;
12: function SPMXV(Val, Colid, Rowidx, x, x′, C, M, cr , cx)
13: sr ← 0 ∈R2×1;
14: for i← 1 to n do
15: yi← 0;
16: sr ← sr +
[w1,i
w2,i
]
Rowidxi;
17: for j← Rowidxi to Rowidxi+1−1 do
18: ind← Colid j;
19: yi← yi +Val j · xind ;
20: dr = cr− sr;
21: dx = Wᵀy−Cᵀx;
22: dx′ = Wᵀ (x′−y)−Mᵀx;
23: if dr = 0∧dx = 0∧dx′ = 0 then
24: return y;
25: else
26: CORRECTERRORS(Val, Colid, Rowidx, x, x′, C, M, dr , dx, dx′ , cr , cx);
for any i, if and only if it lies on hi. As the Lebesgue measure in Rn of an hy-
perplane of Rn itself is zero, the union of these hyperplanes is measurable with
mn (
⋃n
i=1 hi) = 0, where mn denotes the Lebesgue measure of R
n. Therefore, the
probability that a vector w randomly picked in Rn does not satisfy condition (15)
for any i is zero.
Nevertheless, there are many reasons to consider zero checksum columns. First
of all, when working with finite precision, the number of elements in Rn one can
have is finite, and the probability of randomly picking a vector that is orthogonal to
a given one could be bigger than zero. Moreover, a coefficient matrix usually comes
from the discretization of a physical problem, and the distribution of its columns
cannot be considered as random. Finally, using a randomly chosen vector instead
of (1, . . . ,1)ᵀ increases the number of required floating point operations, causing a
growth of both execution time and rounding errors. Therefore, we would like to keep
w = (1, . . . ,1)ᵀ as the vector of choice, in which case we need to protect SpMxV
with matrices having zero column sums. There are many matrices with this property,
for example the Laplacian matrices of graphs [13, Chapter 1].
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In Algorithm 2, we propose an ABFT SpMxV method that uses weighted check-
sums and does not require the matrix to be strictly diagonally dominant. The idea
is to compute the checksum vector and then shift it by adding to all of its entries a
constant value chosen so that all of the elements of the new vector are different from
zero. We give the result in Theorem 3 for the simpler case of single error detection
without correction, in which case Algorithm 2 has W = (1, . . . ,1)ᵀ at line 1 and
raises an error at line 26 (instead of correcting the error) if the tests at line 23 are not
passed. The cases of multiple error detection and single error correction are proved
in a technical report [20, Section 3.2].
Theorem 3 (Correctness of Algorithm 2 for error detection). Let A ∈Rn×n be
a square matrix, let x,y ∈ Rn be the input and output vector respectively, and let
x′ = x. Let us assume that the algorithm performs the computation
y˜← A˜x˜, (16)
where A˜ ∈ Rn×n and x˜ ∈ Rn are the possibly faulty representations of A and x
respectively, while y˜ ∈ Rn is the possibly erroneous result of the sparse matrix-
vector product. Let us also assume that the encoding scheme relies on
1. an auxiliary checksum vector c = [∑ni=1 ai,1+ k, . . . ,∑
n
i=1 ai,n+ k], where k is
such that ∑ni=1 ai, j + k 6= 0 for 1≤ j ≤ n,
2. an auxiliary checksum yn+1 = k∑ni=i x˜i,
3. an auxiliary counter sr initialized to 0 and updated at runtime by adding the
value of the hit element each time the Rowidx array is accessed,
4. an auxiliary checksum cr = ∑ni=1 Rowidxi ∈N.
Then, a single error in the computation of the SpMxV causes one of the following
conditions to fail:
i. cᵀx˜ = ∑n+1i=1 y˜i, difference is in dx at line 21,
ii. cᵀx′ = ∑n+1i=1 y˜i, difference is in dx′ at line 22;
iii. sr = cr, difference is in dr at line 20.
The proof of this theorem is technical and is available elsewhere [20, Theorem 1].
The function COMPUTECHECKSUM in Algorithm 2 requires just the knowledge
of the matrix. Hence in the common scenario of many SpMxVs with the same ma-
trix, it is enough to invoke it once to protect several matrix-vector multiplications.
This observation will be crucial when discussing the performance of the checksum-
ming techniques.
Extensions to k ≥ 2 errors are discussed elsewhere [20, Section 3.2], where the
following are detailed. The method just described can be extended to detect up to a
total of k errors anywhere in the computation, in the representation of A, or in the
vector x. Building up the necessary structures requires O (k nnz(A)) time, and the
overhead per SpMxV is O(kn). For the particular case of k = 2 a result similar to
that in Theorem 3 is also shown.
We now discuss error correction. If at least one of the tests at line 23 of Al-
gorithm 2 fails, the algorithm invokes CORRECTERRORS in order to determine
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whether just one error struck either the computation or the memory and, in that
case, to correct it. Indeed, whenever a single error is detected, disregarding its lo-
cation (i.e., computation or memory), it can be corrected by means of a succession
of various steps, as explained below; if need be, partial recomputations of the result
are performed.
Specifically, we proceed as follows. To detect errors striking Rowidx, we compute
the ratio d of the second component of dr to the first one, and check whether its
distance from an integer is smaller than a certain threshold parameter ε . If it is
so, the algorithm concludes that the d-th element of Rowidx is faulty, performs the
correction by subtracting the first component of dr to Rowidxd , and recomputes yd
and yd−1, if the error in Rowidxd is a decrement; or yd+1 if it was an increment.
Otherwise, it just emits an error.
The correction of errors striking Val, Colid and the computation of y are cor-
rected together. Let now d be the ratio of the second component of dx to the first
one. If d is near enough to an integer, the algorithm computes the checksum ma-
trix C′ = WᵀA and considers the number zC˜ of non-zero columns of the difference
matrix C˜ =| C−C′ |. At this stage, three cases are possible:
• If zC˜ = 0, then the error is in the computation of yd , and can be corrected by
simply recomputing this value.
• If zC˜ = 1, then the error concerns an element of Val. Let us call f the index of the
non-zero column of C˜. The algorithm finds the element of Val corresponding
to the entry at row d and column f of A and corrects it by using the column
checksums much like as described for Rowidx. Afterwards, yd is recomputed to
fix the result.
• If zC˜ = 2, then the error concerns an element of Colid. Let us call f1 and f2
the index of the two non-zero columns and m1, m2 the first and last elements of
Colid corresponding to non-zeros in row d. It is clear that there exists exactly
one index m∗ between m1 and m2 such that either Colidm∗ = f1 or Colidm∗ = f2.
To correct the error it suffices to switch the current value of Colidm∗ , i.e., putting
Colidm∗ = f2 in the former case and Colidm∗ = f1 in the latter. Again, yd has to
be recomputed.
• if zC˜ > 2, then errors can be detected but not corrected, and an error is emitted.
To correct errors striking x, the algorithm computes d, that is the ratio of the
second component of dx′ to the first one, and checks that the distance between d
and the nearest integer is smaller than ε . Provided that this condition is verified, the
algorithm computes the value of the error τ =∑ni=1 xi−cx1 and corrects xd = xd−τ .
The result is updated by subtracting from y the vector yτ = Axτ , where xτ ∈Rn×n
is such that xτd = τ and x
τ
i = 0 otherwise.
Finally, note that double errors could be shadowed when using Algorithm 2, but
the probability of such an event is negligible. Still, there exists an improved version
which avoids this issue by adding a third checksum [20, Section 3.2].
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5.3 Performance model
The performance model is a simplified instance of the one discussed in Sec-
tion 4, and we instantiate it for the three methods that we are considering, namely
ONLINE-DETECTION, ABFT-DETECTION and ABFT-CORRECTION. We have a
linear chain of identical tasks, where each task corresponds to one or several CG
iterations. We execute T units of work followed by a verification, which we call a
chunk, and we repeat this scheme s times, i.e., we compute s chunks, before taking
a checkpoint. We say that the s chunks constitute a frame. The whole execution is
then partitioned into frames. We assume that the checkpoint, recovery and verifi-
cation operations are error-free. For each method below, we let C, R and V be the
respective cost of these operations. Finally, and as before, assume a Poisson pro-
cess for errors and let q be the probability of successful execution for each chunk:
q = e−λT , where λ is the fault rate.
5.3.1 ONLINE-DETECTION
For Chen’s method [12], we have the following parameters:
• We have chunks of d iterations, hence T = dTiter, where Titer is the raw cost of
a CG iteration without any resilience method.
• The verification time V is the cost of the operations described in Section 5.1.
• As for silent errors, the application is protected from arithmetic errors in the
ALU, as in Chen’s original method, but also for corruption in data memory
(because we also checkpoint the matrix A). Let λa be the rate of arithmetic
errors, and λm be the rate of memory errors. For the latter, we have λm =Mλword
if the data memory consists of M words, each susceptible to be corrupted with
rate λword . Altogether, since the two error sources are independent, they have
a cumulated rate of λ = λa + λm, and the success probability for a chunk is
q = e−λT . The optimal values of d and s can be computed by the same method
as in Section 4.
5.3.2 ABFT-DETECTION
When using ABFT techniques, we detect possible errors every iteration, so a chunk
is a single iteration, and T = Titer. For ABFT-DETECTION, V is the overhead due
to the checksums and redundant operations to detect a single error in the method.
ABFT-DETECTION can protect the application from the same silent errors as
ONLINE-DETECTION, and just as before the success probability for a chunk (a sin-
gle iteration here) is q = e−λT .
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5.3.3 ABFT-CORRECTION
In addition to detection, we now correct single errors at every iteration. Just as for
ABFT-DETECTION, a chunk is a single iteration, and T = Titer, but V corresponds
to a larger overhead, mainly due to the extra checksums needed to detect two errors
and correct a single one.
The main difference lies in the error rate. An iteration with ABFT-CORRECTION
is successful if zero or one error has struck during that iteration, so that the success
probability is much higher than for ONLINE-DETECTION and ABFT-DETECTION.
We compute that value of the success probability as follows. We have a Poisson pro-
cess of rate λ , where λ = λa+λm as for ONLINE-DETECTION and ABFT-DETEC-
TION. The probability of exactly k errors in time T is (λT )
k
k! e
−λT [27], hence the
probability of no error is e−λT and the probability of exactly one error is λTe−λT ,
so that q = e−λT +λTe−λT .
5.4 Experiments
Comprehensive tests were performed and reported in the technical report [20]. The
main observation is that ABFT-CORRECTION outperforms both ONLINE-DETEC-
TION and ABFT-DETECTION for a wide range of fault rates, thereby demonstrating
that combining checkpointing with ABFT correcting techniques is more efficient
than pure checkpointing for most practical situations.
6 Conclusion
Both fail-stop errors and silent data corruptions are major threats to executing HPC
applications at scale. While many techniques have been advocated to deal with fail-
stop errors, the lack of an efficient solution to handle silent errors is a real issue.
We have presented both a general-purpose solution and application-specific tech-
niques to deal with silent data corruptions, with a focus on minimizing the over-
head. For a divisible load application, we have extended the classical bound of
Young/Daly to handle silent errors by combining checkpointing and verification
mechanisms. For linear workflows, we have devised a polynomial-time dynamic
programming algorithm that decides the optimal checkpointing and verification po-
sitions. Then, we have introduced ABFT as an application-specific technique to both
detect and correct silent errors in iterative solvers that use sparse matrix vector mul-
tiplies and vector operations.
Our approach only addresses silent data corruptions. While several techniques
have been developed to cope with either type of errors, few approaches are devoted
to addressing both of them simultaneously. Hence, the next step is to extend our
22 G. Aupy, A. Benoit, A. Cavelan, M. Fasi, Y. Robert, H. Sun and B. Uc¸ar
study to encompass both fail-stop and silent data corruptions in order to propose a
comprehensive solution for executing applications on large scale platforms.
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